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1 . Introduction
Consider a finite horizon economy with outside money which has
no intrinsic (i.e., fiat money). At a self"fulfilling (or rational)
expectation equilibrium, not. only the price of money must be zero but also
money has no exchange value. For, -at the end of the horizon all the traders
attempt to spend away money unless price of money is zero and rational
expectation makes price of money to be zero over the horizon.
If we consider an infinite horizon economy, the story is different.
In any period, a trader with positive cash balance may find some other
trader who is willing to accept money. In this case, an equilibrium with
positive price of money may exist.
In [7], Samuelson showed that, in a simple balanced growth
generation overlapping economy, there are indeed cases where traders are
willing to accept money and equilibrium exists with positive price of money.
Moreover, it was shown that, to achieve a Pareto efficient allocation through
a competitive market, the creation of money is necessary in these cases.
Cass and Yaari [3] argued that this pecuniary feature arises
because of a lack of financial intermediary. In a generation overlapping
economy not all traders can trade among each other. Nor there is any
central market as in a usual finite economy. Therefore, some type of
financial intermediation like money is necessary to establish Pareto
efficiency of a competitive equilibrium. Then, one might ask when this type
of financial intermediation is called for.
In terms of Gale [4j, a simple economy of the type of Samuelson
possesses two distinct possibilities of stationary competitive equilibrium
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(golden-rule or no-trade). Moreover, the optimal (or Pareto efficient)
equilibrium requires the existence of fiat money if the economy satisfies
a condition which Gale called the Samuelson case. Hayashi [5] showed, in
more general but still restricted class of economies, that money is necessary
for Pareto efficiency of an equilibrium when initial' endowment- is not Pareto
efficient.
However, most of the models above are of very simple nature,
i.e., each generation live for two period and/or there is only one good
except money, in addition to the property that the economy is either
stationary or of balanced growth nature. If these restrictions are removed,
a simple result like in [3] or [5] no longer holds. It is worthwhile to
mention here that the question of existence of a monetary equilibrium in
non-stationary economy was investigated by Okuno [6]; it was shown that,
under some very restrictive assumptions, there is an equilibrium where
money has a positive exchange value.
We consider the following model. In each period, a finite
number of consumers are born. All the consumers live the same, but finite,
number of periods. The number of goods is (finite) constant over time.
Those, and only those, consumers who live on the first day of the economy
may have positive amount of fiat money. Therefore, the total amount of
fiat money is constant over the time. Transactions are costless even for
future markets. However, transactions with consumers who are either not
born or have died are prohibited. In other words, consumers can issue
I.O.U. (inside money) but they must clear their obligations by the time
of their death. We treat these I.O.U. and fiat money separately. We
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call equilibrium monetary if fiat money has a positive value and barter
otherwise.
In view of Cass and Yaari's work the following questions arise;
(1) If there is a system of financial intermediaries, notably that of the
"social contrivance of money", are . competitive equilibria which utilize
these intermediaries necessarily Pareto efficient? Namely, in our set-up,
are monetary equilibria always Pareto efficient? (2) If the answer is no,
what makes equilibria Pareto inefficient and in what situations equilibria
are Pareto efficient? This paper answers these questions.
In Section 2, we present a model which is slightly different
from an economy described above. (The equivalence of the economy above
and our model is shown in the Appendix). In Section 3, we prove the existence
of a competitive equilibrium, although it can be monetary or barter, Pareto
efficient or inefficient. In Section 4, the question (1) of Pareto efficiency
of competitive equilibria, especially in regard to the role of money, is
answered with the help of a few examples. In Section 5, sufficient con-
ditions for efficient equilibrium are discussed by using theories on
efficiency prices (especially, by Benveniste [2]). In Section 6, we discuss
relationship between our result and that by Cass-Yaari [3], present an open
question accompained by an interesting example.
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2 . Descrip ti on of the Economy
There are an infinite number of tine periods (t = 1, 2, ...)
and in each period there are m identical goods. All the goods are
completely perishable. There is also (outside) money which has no in-
trinsic value but it is the economy's only store of value. We .assume,
for simplicity, that all consumers (except those who were born before
period 1) live for the same number of periods, N + 1 (N > 1). Consumers
are denoted by i = 1, 2, .... Let O.trd, 2, ...} be the period in which
i is born. Hence i-th consumer is born in 0. and dies in 9. -+• N .
1 x
We also use the notation L. = i9. , 3.+ 1, ... 8.4- N}, a set of periods1X1 i
in which i lives. The set of individuals who are born in the same period t
is called t-th generation ana denoted by G , i.e., G - (i|8. t}. We
assume that for all t = 1, 2, ..., G is a non-empty and finite set.
00 m
Let E = X E where m — m for all t . Let E, be the
t=l
non-negative cone of E . We assume that the ordering of all the consumers
in this economy is made according to their age, i.e., for any i
, j ,
i 1 j if and only if 8, > 0, , We denote by k. the following type of
sequence in E ; x. = (x. (1), x.(2), ... ) z: E where x.(t)£E for all t
and X. (t) = for all t - L. = \ 9
.
, - .
-
, 6 . + N} . We denote bv x. the
i ill -l
projection of x. on the coordinates of L . Namely, x = fx (&.)»
-i i ' -i v i i
x.(e
i
+ i), ..., x.(e. -f m)f Em(N+1) .
Each consumer i has a vector of initial endowments in each
period t in L.
,
w.(t) . A sequence of initial endowments is denoted
by w.£ E
+
where w.(t) = for all t~L. . The consumption possibility
set for i
,
X. , is assumed as
l
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X = {c.fE jr. (t) = for all t £ LJ
i - 1 + - i
' i
We denote by c =' (c.). , - fc, , c„, ... ) the allocation of consumptions
- i 1=1 -1 •
2
in the economy. The set of feasible consumption allocations is defined as
X = c = (c ) . , ic " X. for all i and I c.(t) < Z w. (t) for all t • ,
~i 1=1 -xi ,i — . - 1i=l i=l
Each consumer i has the preference ordering, ">., , defined over
i
E , i.e., over the lifetime bundles of consumption. We assume that
for each i his preference ordering is represented by a utility function
u. : E > E . Finally, we assume that consumers in the first
period may have a positive amount of initial money holding, m. •: E, . For
generality, we denote by m. an amount of initial money holding for i ,
but we assume m. .> for all i , to. = for all i with 9. > 1 and11 i
m = 2 m. > .
The following assumptions on initial endowments and the utility
functions will be made.
CO
Assumption I : For all i w. (t) > for all t L. , £ w.(t) >> and
i=l
£ w.(t)|j < M for all t , for some constant M
i=l i
Assumption I I: For all i , u. is continuous, increasing and strictly
quasi-concave and u.(w.) - .
Let c* = (c.) in X . e* is Pareto efficient if
(1) c. -. w. for all i and (2) there is no c = (c). , in X such
•
-x 1 -i ~i i-j.
-,v *
that c. >. c for all i and c. >. c. for some j . Note that our
-l i -i
-;} j -j
definition of Pareto efficiency requires individual rationality as well.
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Let X* be the set of all Pareto efficient allocations in X .
A sequence of prices of goods will be denoted by p = (p(l),
p(2), ...] E . Given prices p and a consumption allocation c in • X ,
we have the price of money, p (p, c) . The fact that the price of money
can be taken constant over time is shown in the Appendix.
Let U = (u = (a , a , . ,.)[a. = u.(c.) for all i for some
c
•' XJ and let U* = {u = (a , a , ...)'" U| there is c X* such that
u.(c.) = a. for all i} .
i — z. x
Definition : (p*, c*) is a competitive equilibrium if p* r. E+ , p* >
c* = (c.'K ' X , p
m(p*, c*) > , and for all i
(a) p*«c. < p**w + p (p*, c*)-mi
(b) c maximizes u. over {c. " X, jp*«c± < p*«w± + p (p*,c*)'m±j .
* * * 1
Definit ion: (p*, u*. c*) where u* = (u , u. , ...) with ui E
1S a
compensated equilibrium if p* > , p
m(p*, c*) > , c*' X , and for all i
(a') c. minimizes p*«c. over {c. X.ju.(c) >. u }
_
x _ .- 1 . i i ' x —x — x
(V) p**c. = p**w. + p (p*, c*)»m i .
Given a competitive equilibrium, (p*, c*) , we call it a monetary
equilibrium if p
m
(p*, c*) > and a bar ter equilibrium if p (p*, c*) -

3-1
3 . Existence of a Competitive Equi librium
In this section, we shall prove the existence of a competitive
equilibrium in this economy. For this purpose, we shall introduce a few
definitions and an assumption.
For each time period T *. N + 1 let F denote the set of of all
consumers who will die on or before T , i.e., F = {i ] Q. +N <_ T} .
T
Let. X be the projection of X on F , namely
J.
X
T
= it? = (c). _ I c.(t) < £ w.(t) for all t < T} .
-
11 F
T i F
T
X "= i=l
X
Note that the aggregate consumption for F may exceed their aggregate
T
endowment. Let U be the projection of U on F , or
T T i T T -
U ={u = (a. )... _ a. =u.(c.) for all i:F„ for some c in X }
x x F ' x X -x T
Next, the sees of (individually rational and) Pareto efficient
T
allocations in X , and the corresponding utility allocations are
X = ic •= (c). ^ in X ' c. -. w. for all i- F and
-T T
there is no c • X s.t. c. -. c. for ail i - F„.
- X ' X -X i
and c. -. c. for some i Fr„}
-J J -J 1
T* T T T T*
U = {u = (ct.),- ^ in U there exists c X such that
x * - F '
1
a. = u.(c.) for all i- Fm }
x l -i T
Let us introduce now the foilowing definitions.
T T
Definition: c = (c). . _ in X is T-efficient if c. -.. w. for
~ -.11 F„ -l x -l
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all i F_ and there is no c - (c). ._ , X c. < I c ,
L X F
T
x F
T
c. -. c. for all i in Fm and for some i Fm , c . -. c..
-ii-i T T'
-j J -j
c* = (c ) , in X is shor t-run efficien t if for all T ,
~i i=l
*
(c.). , „ is T-efficient. Obviously, a short-run efficient allocation
is not necessarily Pareto efficient.
T T
Definition: Given c"" - (c
. ) . „ in X . let i and i' be any two\.x i . F_ '
commodities, t and t' <_ T be any two periods. We say that timed commodities
T
(t, j) and (t
' ,
j') are resource-rel ated (with respect to c ), if there
exists i in F , such that c..(t) > and c.,,(t') > . We say
T
that (t, j) and (t* , j') are indirectly-recource-related (w. r. t. c )
Q
if there is a finite sequence ((t,
, j, )llr_n such that (t , j ) = (t, j) ,K. K. ix~U O O
(t£) j y. )
= (t', j') and (t
k_ l5 J k-1 )
ls resource-related to (t
fc
, j
fc
) for
Assumption III: Any (t, j) and (t', j') (1< j, j' <m, 1< t, t' <T)
T
are indirectly resource related with respect to any T-efficient c , for anv 1'
We shall use Assumption III to prove existence of competitive
equilibrium. However, we show first that this assumption implies another
important property of intergenerational substitution of consumption.
Definition : Let c X' be T-efficient (c*' X be short-run efficient,
respectively) and c > . Period 1 is said to be e-resource relate d to
period t <, T with respect to c (c* , resp.) if there exists c = (c ) . „
~ rj.
such that
(a) c.(l) = Z c*<l) + (1, 1 , 1) ,
1 r
?
1 - F
T
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(b)
_ c.(t) = E c.(t) -
_(1, 1, ..., 1)
(c) c (T) - c*(t) for all t £ 1 , X ± I, t,
i .- F
T
x
i _ F_
X
(d) c. X. and c. >:. c. for all i£ Fm .
-i
.
x -l x -x T
T T T
I.emna 1 : For each T , there exist positive scalers {_ , _ , •-. e }
X x* T
such that for all T-efficient allocations, c X , period 1 is c'-resource
_—__ ______
__
_ 1 —_
related to period t .
T T*
Proof : For each c - X , by Assumption III and monotonicity of a. , 1
is e-resource related to t for some e > . Let e (c ) be the maximum
of such e > (one can take maximum, for _ is defined over a compact set
X* . X*
as is easily seen by the definition) . For any T-efficient c v X , and for
T* "T
any 6,0<6<_(c")by Assumption III, there exists c satisfying
t ~
condition (a), (c) and
(b r ) Z c.(t) = _ c?(t) - 6(1, 1, ..., 1)
i F_ i - F
T
*
(d') c • X. and c. -. c. for all i " Fr„ .
~x x -x j -x T
Since u. is continuous, there is a (relatively) open neighborhood of
X* x T* T T T*
c in X , N(c 6)7 X , such that for all c - N(c , 6) , peirod 1 is
T
6-resource related to period t . Therefore e (c ) is continuous. Since
T
by assumption III, the set of all T-efflcient c in X is compact, there
T T T I
is e = min {e (c )|c X Lent) > .
t c _
Given Assumptions I-II [ , we can prove
Theorem 1 : There exists a competit Ive equilibrium .
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Let us prove first the following Lemma.
Lemma 2 : For each T , T > N + 1 , there exists c = ( e
.
) . in X ,
p E v;ith p (t) = for all t_JL_T , and p > such that for all i : FT
T* * T* , mT* -(a) p "C < p »w. + p -ra.
« v * . . r r- v± i T* T* mT* - ,(.b; c. maximizes u, over lc." X i p *c. < p *w.H-p 'm.}
-l i i ' C ,.i — i i
Proof: The proof is essentially similar to Arrow-Rahn's [1, ch. 5]; However,
due to our special structure and existence of money, some parts are subs-
tantially different.
Given T , T > N + 1, define
S
T
-
(p* E
+ | |ip
T
(l)|; = 1
, !|p
T
{t)|[ = ~ for all 2 < t < T and p
X
(t) = (
£
r
r TtTfor all t > T}, where the sequence of positive scalars (el -, is given by
Lemma 1. Define a mapping p' : S > E, by
p (p ) = - • - P (t) w (t)
m i : pm t=T-N
ra T -
In other words, p (p )m, the value of the money, is made so that
PTi
it is exactly equal to the value of endowments in X , which does not
T Tproperly belong to the consumers in F . Given prices p S and allocation
T .. T T
c X , we define budget surplus tor all i in F ,
/ T T. i . m,. T -
s.Cp s c ) - p (w. + p (p )a. .
T T 1
Let Z = {v = (v ) v , ! v.£ ,L' and v. = 1} . Define
1:F
I
T T T" T T
ijj : I * U in the following way: For v c £ , define

3-5
rr, rp rp rp rrl m T TA
^ (v~) - max {a > | Av ~U }*v . *J> is well defined because (1) u f U
if u. = for all i £ F , since E w. (t) - E w.(t) > for all t
1 T i=l 2 i F *
T
t
I-B+l < t <T (note the definition of X ) and (2) any Pareto efficient
T T*
allocation c X is also weakly Pareto efficient because of Assumption III
(i.e., if c Pareto-dominates c then u.(c„) > u.(c.) for all i- F_
s T ,T . -
for some c in X ) . V is a continuous function.
T i T*
For each u = (a ) . in IT , define corresponding consump-
T T*
tions c In X by,
T* HP T" Tit
W (u ) = {c - X I u.Cc.) =a. for all i£ F_} .
i _ i i j-
T
W is single-valued and continuous by Assumption II.
For each c in X , define
B
x
(c ) = {(x(l), ...» x(7)j E
m
j there exist
-X
c = (c.). _ such that c. > c,
_i'i F
T
-l 'x -i
for all i F_ and
E c (t) < E c.(t) + x(t) for all t < T}
i F_ ~~~ i - Fm
x
T T
T T
B (c ) is strictly covex and contains a non-empty interior. Furhtermore,
rj rj, Vr.
(0, ..., 0)
-f Int 3 (c ). Define P : X —* S, as follows:
P
T
(c
1
) = fp
1
S
T
|
(t)x(t) > for all (x(l) , . .
.
, x(T)J in B (c
T
)}
t=3
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By the well-known separation theorem, there exists a non-trivial prices
fp(l),..., p(T)J E™ satisfying the condition of V (c ) except that
T T
p S . By the definition of e-resource relatedness and Lemma 1,
fx(l), . .., x(T)) B
T
(c
T
) when x(l) = (1, -.., 1), x(t) = -£*«(1, ..., 1)
'T
and x(t) = for all t > T , r.J 1, t . Therefore || p(l)|| -r e-
c
||p(t) j| >
rp rp
-j™ T T
or |jp(t)[|< i|p(D|| /e • Hence p S • P (c ) is non-empty, convex,
compact-valued, and upper semi-continuous.
T T T T
Finally, define V : S x X —> I ,
V
T
(p
T
, c
T
) = {v
T
L
T
j Vj. = if s
i (p
T
,
c
T
) < 0} .
T 1 T
V (p , c ) f <i , convex, compact valued, and upper-semi-continuous. Now,
consider the following correspondence.
TTTTTTTT T T T T
P °W °»K XV * W °<i> : S x Z * X > S x 2 x X
This correspondence satisfies all the conditions of Kakutani's fixed point
theorem
.
T»fc T^ T^»
Let (p , v , c ) be the fixed point. By our definition,
T* T* T* T T* / T* T* „T*.
c X . Let us show that when u = i1 (v
.
) , tP > Ll » £ '
satisfies (a') and (b
'
) of the definition of compensated equilibrium for
all i- F . Assume s.(p , c ) < for some i . By definition of
V
, v. = and u.(c.) =0 . Since u.(w.) = we come to
X* * *0>s.(p
, c.) >_ p (w.-c.) which contradicts the fact that
l „ _ i — „i ~ i
T* T T* T* T* , r- .
p P (c ) . Therefore s . (p , c ) > for all i . By the defxnition
m T'ft — —
of p (o ) and notin n. , we see that
i
I
Z s.(pT , c 1 ) = (w - c )]- p
m
Cp
L )-m=-0
if F J " " i t F
T T
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X" £*
Hence s
. (p , c ) = for all i in F •
Finally, because of Assumption III and monotonicity of u. "s,
conditions for compensated equilibrium are equivalent to those of competitive
X* * • I*
equilibrium (i.e., p *c. > for all i F » since p (t) >> for
all t < T)
.
7* T* mT* v
Proof of Theo rem 1 : Let (c , p , p .) be the fixed point
X*
we obtained in Lemma 1. Let u be the corresponding utility values,
*
-T -T -T -ffiT, °° -T T* -T
,
which is in U . Let (p , u , c , p ) T_-i satisfy; p = p ; u • li
-T T* -T -T T* -mT mT*
such that Proj u = u ; c X such that Proj c = c ; p = p
p p
T T
,_X _X _'£. oo
Then there is a subsequence of [p (1) , u", c J which converges
f
-* *1 il II *
coordinate-wise to [p*(l), u , c J such that || p A (l) || = 1 , u U , and
c* X .
To show that c* is short run efficient, notice that by
Assumption III it can be proved, in a straightforward manner, that a limit
of k-efficient allocations (for some finite k) is a k-efficient allocation.
k k
This follows from the fact that if c = ( is Pareto-dominated,
_i i F.
- k *•k k
then there exists some k-efficient (c). ._, s.t. u . (c . ) > u.(c.) for
X X X -1 1 -X
K
all i in F. .
V:';
Given anv T for all T > T , (c. )
.
. is T -efficient
o o . i i fc t o
o
-t x* T*(otherwise, for some (c.). _ with I c. < '[. c. we have
T
o
a
^T * "
F
T
~X x* T* ~T *T
u.(c.) > u.(c. ) for all i in F r„ . This implies I p~ (c. - c. ) >x-ii-x 1
.
.. _ _ ^x ~x
o x F
T
o
*
which is impossible.) This implies that (e.) is T -efficient for
-i'icF„ ~
any T , hence c* ia short-run efficient,
o -
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Since c* is short-run efficient, by Assumption III, there
exists a sequence of positive scalars {e , z , ..., ) such that 1 is
c - resource related to t for ail t with respect to c*. Therefore,
t
for given t , there exist T and (c.). , which satisfy the con-
o „ A
ditions of 6-resource relatecness with 6 (0 < o < e )' and with c. > c
L.
— X 1 1
for all i6F (by Assumption III again). Because of the coordinatewise
o T*
convergence, period 1 must be 6-resource related to t for all c for
T sufficiently large. Therefore {p (t) }__. must be bounded and we
can find a converging subsequence. Finally, for such a subsequence,
oo N-M
mT* mT* —i ml T* * T*
{p } is bounded, for . Z„ p -m = P -m <_ £ p -c i I z p (t)w (t) ,
1 G
l . i€G~ - 1 " i=l t=l ' *
which is unformly bounded. Let (p*, p ) be the limit of such a converging
subsequence. Then p™ > , p* > since ||p*(l)|] = 1 , and
m*
s.(p*, c*) = for all i . It can be shown easily that (p*, u*, c*, p )
is a compensated equilibrium, which, in turn, is a competitive equilibrium
by Assumption III,
Q.E.D.

4 . Efficiency of an Equilibrium
In their paper [3], Cass and Yaari, in effect, claim as follows.
In an economy with overlapping generations, there is no "Walras market",
for some consumers in different generations may not be allowed to trade'
each other. To achieve an efficient equilibrium in a limited market
structure, some device like a financial intermediary is called for.
Therefore, there may exist an equilibrium with money actively traded.
Example 1
Consider the following economy, which has the same structure as
our model. Let m (the number of goods) be one. Let each consumer live
for two periods. We index them as 0,1,2,... . 6 = i for all i > 1 .
For i = , he lives only at t = 1 . Their initial endowment is as in
the Table 1 while we assume m„ = 1 and m. = for all i 5 1.
x
i n^ 1 2 3
' 1
1 •> 1 •
2 3 1
•
""
.
Table 1
Finally, let utility u. = Ha c.(e.) + £n c
±
(Q
±
+ 1) for all i £ 1
and u = In c„ (1)
.
There are two equilibria, one is barter and the other monetary.
Barter equilibrium is such that consumption is exactly the same as initial
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t-1
allocation and prices satisfy ?(t) = 3 p(l; for all t. Monetary
equilibrium is such that consumption is as in Table 2, prices satisfy
p(t) = p(l) = p
m
for all t . The Barter equilibrium is Pareto inefficient,
for it is dominated by the monetary one and the monetary equilibrium is
Pareto efficient. Therefore, the example not only seems to confirm
Cass-Yarri contention but also indicate importance of distinguishing a
Pareto efficient equilibrium from an inefficient one.
i \v X 2 3
2
1 2 2
2
•i£ 2
Table 2
Example 2
However, it is not too difficult to construct an inefficient
monetary equilibrium. For example, let us keep essentially the same
structure of the first example but change their initial endowment slightly
as in Table 3 with e > 0. Then the barter equilibrium (of consumption
and prices) in the first example becomes a monetary equilibrium in the
new situation with p™ = ep(l). Since the aggregate endowments are the
same as before, our monetary equilil Ls Pareto inefficient.
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H
1
2
1-e
3-fe 1-3 e
3+3" 1
,
-2
1-3 "~£
3+3 e 1-3 e
Table 3
As a matter of fact, a monetary equilibrium and a barter equili-
brium are not too different in some cases. Suppose we obtain a barter
equilibrium with equilibrium prices p which satisfy lim inf jj p(t) [J > 0.
t-x»
Then, in general, we can redistribute initial endowments in each period
from a young generation to a old generation, and make the original barter
equilibrium a monetary equilibrium in a new economy. Moreover, we can
make this redistribution as small as possible, as is the case of £ in
our example. Namely, any barter equilibrium with lim inf |j p(t) j| >
t-*»
is considered as the limit of a sequence of monetary equilibria where each
monetary equilibrium belongs to a different economy but these economies
converge to the economy in question.
More disturbingly, if at any equilibrium, lim sup j| p(t) [j = ,
then the equilibrium can never be monetary because the value of money
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m —
p .m must sooner or later exceed the value of economy's total initial
endowments. But as we show in Theorem 2 below, such a ("barter) equilibrium
is always Pareto efficient.
Some readers may observe that the Example 2 is of very absurd
nature. If p is unbounded, one unit of good in period 1 has the same
value as a very small units of goods in a distant future. Hence one can
make a sequence of transfers of goods, of the same value, from young
generations to older generations in each period, and eventually make this
transfer disappear in the limit, thus creating a Pareto-dominating
allocation. A. seemingly natural conclusion, in view of strict-quasi-
concavity of the utilities (Assumption II), seems to be the following one.
If lim sup
i| p(t)jj < °° , then a (monetary) equilibrium is Pareto efficient-
Unfortunately, this contention is, again, incorrect as the following
example shows.
Example 3
Let the generational structure be the same as in Example 1.
Let the initial endowments be as in the Table 4. Namely, ^nC^) = 1 - £"3 ,
M.(l) = 3 + £-3 q ,
2
io. (6.) = 3 + c *3 for all ii2,
-q+~
(i).(S.+l) = 1 - e«3 for all i > I ,
2
where c is an arbit smaJ ositive number and q = tt /6 . Let
utility functions be
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l-e*3
3+e •
3"
q l-e*3
3+e • 3
-al-1
q+1
-q+-
1-e -3
-q+-
3+e«3
-q+-
l-e-3
Table 4
i
Z
-l
u.(c(!3
i
),c(6
i
+l)) =
.2 .2
c(8.)
x
+ c(6.+l) 1
L
x
i -1-] .2-1
i
for all i>2,
^(0(1)^(2)) = in c{l) + £n c(2) and u (c(l)) - In. c(l)
Then there is a monetary equilibrium with consumption allocation as in
Table 1 with prices
t-1 .2
x
p(t> = ?(!)• TT 3
i=l
t-1
p(l) for all t > 2
To see this, observe that for any ii 1, marginal rate of substitution of
i/i 2
c(0.) for c(e.+l) is [c(8.}/c(8.+l)j . Therefore, at the
i x i x
equilibrium, MRS = Z ' . Moreover, since )_ —= - ff /6 = q ,
i=l i
lim p(t) is finite. However, a, this equilibrium allocation is Pareto
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dominated by the allocation in Table 2. Because for any i > 1, the equilibrium
consumption (c*(0
.) ,c*(9 .+1)) = (3,1) is indifferent to (1,3) .
Since consumption in Table 2 is a convex combination of these two, strict
qua'si-concavity of utility functions asserts that Table 2 consumption
dominates the equilibrium allocation.
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5 . Chara cterization of Efficient Equilibi i
.
In this section, we shall ask the following question; under
what conditions there is a (monetary or barter) Pareto efficient equilibrium?
Let us start with a relatively simple case.
HI"
Theorem 2: Let (p*, c*, p ) be a competitive equ ilibrium . If .
lira sup ||p*(t)|j = , then c* is an efficient equilibrium .
t -*- °°
Proof: Suppose that c* is not efficient. Then there exists an allocation
*
c X which dominates c*, i.e., c. r. . c. for ail i and for some j ,
~
-i x -i J
* ft *
c - . c. . Therefore, P**c. — p A «c for all i and p*«c. > p*-c. .
- J -J ~ -x ~ - -i ~ ~3 ~ ~J
Let T = h . + K , the last period in which j lives. Then for any T >* T ,
o j o
F contains j and
< X p*.(c. - c.)
i ; F ~ "
a " X
T
T-N+l
^
T A
Z I P*(t)[c.(t)-c.(t)l+ Z Z p*(t)fc.(t) -c.(t)
ifF
T
t=l
X
i F t=T-N+2
a X
< Z Z p*(t)[c.(t) - c At)] .
if F t=T-N+2
*
However the right hand side goes to zero as T — > » , for I [c.(t) -c. (t)
i : F
X L
T
is uniformly bounded by Assumption I, a contradiction.
Q.E.D .
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If lim sup j!p(t)]{ > , we need some conditons for Pareto
t -> <»
efficiency. The following approach makes direct use of the result by
Benveniste [2] on efficiency prices. In the proof of Theorem 1, we show
that a competitive equilibrium is always short-run efficient.
Let K, = !i|T< 8 < T •+ N - 1} , i.e., the set of all the
consumers who live in both periods T + N - 1 and T + N . Given a
short-run efficient allocation c -. X
,
define
D
T
(c) = ((xT; X*) = (x
T
(T), ..., x
T
(T + N-l); xT (T + N), ...,
-T ^\ - ?mN , -i
x (T+2N-l)JrE There exists (c">
. „ such that
-
±
' \
c. S. c. for all i: H and
-1 l -x I
c,(t) - 1 c.(t) + x (t) for all t
,
i H i H
T < t < T + 2N - 1)
Since c is short-run efficient, we can define a social (aggregate)
Tindifference curve at c . D (c) is (the translate of) upper contour
set for this indifference curve. In the examples in the previous section
where there is only one good, there is only one consumer in each generation
T
and each consumer lives only for two periods, D"(c) is exactly equal to
upper contour set for the consumption. In Example 3, we showed that if
the indifference curve loses "strict" curvature over the time, we might
find a Pareto inefficient equilibrium. fore, we shall define the
"coefficient of strictness" o rence curve similar to
Benveniste [2].
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Let (p*, c*, p' ) be a competitive equilibrium, then c* is
short-run efficient as was shown In the proof of Theorem 1.
Define
T+N-l
Q
T
(c*, p*) » {(X* X 1 ) DT (c*) | Z p*'(t)-x
T
(t) < 0}
~ t=T
The following definition of jj-strictness guarantees that if
c* is short-run efficient with support p*
,
then given T we can find
* T
a tangent "paraboloid" at (c.) containing D (c*) .
-x 1 " H
m*
Definition: Given a competitive equilibrium (p*, c*, p ) , c* is
—T -T T
jj -strict at T if for all (X., , X„) in Q (c*, p*) , we have
T+2N-1 T+N-l u (T+N-l V
P*(t)-,x
i (t)>- Z p*(t)-xi(t) +
^q¥rr
- Z p*(t)-x(t)|
t=T+N t=T /' t/ ,, /t ,| t=T
L
t=T
p*(t)-w(t) 1-
where w(t) = Z w,(t) , i.e., the aggregate endowment of the economy at
i=l
x
t . Denote by IL = sup {y ! c* -strict at T'l .
Remark : Our definition of u -strictness generalizes that of Benveniste.
The reader is referred to [2! for detailed tnation of this condition.
OS
Given c* in X , I e ! , cients of resource related-
t t=i
ness if f° r all t e - sup 1 is £ resource related to
period t (w.r.t. c*)}.
m*
Theorem 3 A competitive equil ibrium p ) is Pareto efficient
if, at c*
,
00
(a) the c of resource relatedness (c ) , satisfy
t t= a —_—
_
E e = «> , and
t=l

5-
(b) there exists \i > such that for al l. T >
u >_ u , where c* is
Remark : Examples 1 and 2 can be considered as counter examples for the
theorem without (a) and example 3 as a counter example for the theorem
without (b). By assuming uniform smoothness in the analogous manner
(see [2]), we can prove that condition - . cf icient for Pareto
efficiency of a competitive equilibrium.
Proof : Because of (a), an argument similar to the one in the proof of
T
Lemma 1 shows that E l/|{p(t)|| —> °° as T °" .
t-1
*
Suppose there, exists c X such that c. .-. c. for all i
*
and c. -. c. for some j . Define a sequence t. = (k - 1)N + 1 for
2 3 J k t, t,+N-l
kik where k is such that j •" H . Define p = ip*(t)l
o o t,
v K* Jt=t,
k k
o
t. t t
and (L , JL ) such that X (t) = I
.
(t) - c.(t)] for all t
J. JL
_, 3 X
i H\
_t _t
with t < t < t + 2N - 1 . Defd , - p -X n for all k > 1 and
_t. _t
&
2 ?
K
* X
? '
for a11 k
-
2
p*[c. - c.J = p -X + p -X = 6 + o >
* Ck
for all k with strict inequality with k = k . Since c* is an
.
t + N~l°
K .A
equilibrium allocation and ccX , X. E p*(t)[c.(t) - c.(t)j
t=t
k
t t t
= P
k
lX
k
+ X
2
k_1
J
= 6
k
+ d
k
< for all k > 2 and
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-
N_1
* -
c
i -
c
i 1
£ I p*(t)[c.(t) - cAc)] = p -X - 6., <_
i=l t=I
.Therefore, o" (6
k
, respectively) - a in-decreasing ' (non-increasing)
' k k
sequence of non-negative (n numbers and 6 2 >
(&
1
< 0)
for all k > k + 1 .
o
t t t
Hence, (x\ X^) C Q fc (c* s p*) for all k > kQ + 1 and using (b),
there exists u, > V > such tl
5
k+1
> _ 5
k
+ -^(6k)
2
>
-i
k
+ —(S
k
)
2
> for all k > k + 1 (1)
2 = 1 n. l = J- nk
i ~ °
t +N-1
where n. = S p*(t)-w(t) > . Since
-«J
>-«
2
> ° for a11
t=t.
K.
k > k + 1 , (1) is rewritten i -.
— o
,k, 2
6
7
+1
i 6 2
Define V, = 5^/rj, . For all k > k + 1 , V > , and sincek 2 k ok
t
x (t) < w(t) for all t and k , V . Then, (2) becomes
ViVi i Vk + ^\ (V > ° £or ali k « ko + l (3)
Taking the inverse of the both sides,
1
<
1 K._ X
VlVl ^ \\ 1 + u \
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or
JL < 1 + V —
—
•.'—
-
! for all k > k + 1
k
V
k \+lV] . ~ °
(4)
Adding (A) from k = k + 3 to K - 1 and cancelling terms,
K-l
i_
<
i + p r i_
k=k +1 "k ]i \\ +l\
i_ i < i±Ji l__J:
l, V, i = -
o o
k+1 k+i'. I Lt ft. ' -1- R. ^
L ° °
and £ ~ < «
k=k +1 it
o
However
,
t, +N-1
k t,
+N-1
00 > Z — :
k=k +1 'k k „
o okk+i t-V, p*<t>-W(t) - k.k+1 t. tE l/j|p*(t)jl-i|w(t)i|
Since v(t) is uniformly bounded by Assumption I, it implies
£ l/|jp*(t)jj < °° , which is a contradiction.
t=t.k +1
o
Q.E.D.
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6 . Conclusions and Remarks
In an economy with a generational structure, one would not
expect to have the existence, of Kalras market. Hence, unless there is
some "double coincidence of wants" between generations, an equilibrium
may be Pareto inefficient in a sequence of markets generated by a genera-
tional structure. This is precisely the reason why Cass-Yaari looked
into a "closed-loop" model, which is a finite analogue of a stationary
generational economy. It seems that they conclude that if money is
introduced to the market, a central clearing house, which was lacking
without money, was effectively restored because money plays a role of
intermediation. As we saw in Section 4, it is incorrect if one extends
his attention beyond a stationary economy. It is true, in some cases,
that the introduction of money makes a new equilibrium Pareto efficient.
But not all monetary equilibrium are Pareto efficient, namely financial
intermediation does not always remedy the lack of Walras markets.
As we observed in Section 5, the question of Pareto efficiency
of a competitive (barter or monetary) equilibrium is closely related to
the question of efficiency prices. , r , Lems seem to be inherent to
the infinity of horizon more . . - else.
However, it should be noted that our f: igs do not refute the
claim by Cass-Yaari altoge • pie where there is
neither monetary nor bart^
i
ent eq i ura. We believe
that the following conjecture eco] tot find a Pareto
efficient equilibria inter:.. (money), there is a Pareto
efficient equilibrium in t. r.y with money. To this end, one
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must show the existence of a Pareto efficient (barter or monetary)
equilibrium. One might hope that a direct application of Arrow-Hahn. [1]
approach may do just this. Unfortunately, there is some technical
obstacle, that is, the utility frontier U* is not closed in Lhe
topology of convergence in coordinates {the most natural topology in
this economy)
.
So, it is an open question if the non-existence of a Pareto
efficient barter equilibrium is a sufficient condition for the existence
of a Pareto efficient monetary equilibrium. Let us conclude this paper by
presenting yet another example, which shows that it is not a necessary
condition. Namely, an example which contains both Pareto efficient barter
and Pareto efficient monetary equilibria.
There are two goods in the economy in addition to money. In
each period, consumers 2t and 2t + 1 are born. TA'e refer the first
consumer as an "even" consumer and the second as an "odd" consumer. All
the even consumers and all the odd consumers have the same characteristics,
respectively, except the date of birr . for an even consumer, 2t
,
r , i 711711,initial endowment is (w.(.t), w.(t -f l)j = (— , — , — , — ) , i - 2t , his
utility function
u. = In {min fc, (t), c.„(t)]} + In {min [c- (t-KL) , c .„(t+l)]}, i = 2t .
1 11 1Z li 12
An odd consumer 2t + 1 has initial endowment
it), w
i
(t + 1)) = (4, 2- 0, 12), i = 2t + 1
,
u - lMc,.,(t)] 1 +^[c (t)] 1 }~h + Uc.,(t+1)] I + [c. (t+l)l 1 ~h , i =
1 11 1
Z
I.J. li
2t + l

Consumers and 1 live only in perio* with
w
Q
(l) = (~, |) and ».,(!) = (0, 12)
u = An {min [c l),llcQ (l)]}
6-3
•
i .-•<
u
n
= in C[c_,(l)] " -r [c 19 (l)
x
}
'2
-
12
Finally, let m. = ror all i f 1 and m_ =•' — . The initial endow-
i. i 5
merit allocation is summed up in Table 5. Then there exist at 1 eat two
distinct equilibria, one monetary and the other barter.
2*4-
{
2 ' ?/
(0, 12)
(
71 1
}
,71 1
C4 S 2) (0, 12)
,71 1, ,71 1_,
2 ' 2 ^ 2 ' 2
,12)
Le 5
A monetary equi
[
1 Location is shown in
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Table 6 while prices are p(t) = (1, 1) for all t and p = 1 . A
barter equilibrium consumption allocation is shown in Table 7 while prices
are p(t) = (1 , 4) for all t and p "" = C . Since both allocations
satisfy conditions for Theorem 3. Pareto . efficient
.
t i
(33, 3)
1
,36 36
<.
5
, 5
)
2 (33, 3) (33, 3)
3
.36 36
{
5 ' 5
4 (33, 3)
,9 9.
(t. t)
,36 36.
5 3
Table 6
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t I
1
2
3
4
5
V
2 ' 2
;
(16, 3)
,55
2
/ 5_1 5.
(
'2
' 2'
(4, 2) (16, 3)
,55 5.
(T' 2°
(4, 2)
,55 5
)( 2 » 2
(16, 8)
Table 7
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APPE
We consider the following economy . - before there are m goods
and a finite number of consumers in each • od t . Let H be a set of
individuals living at t , i.e., S. - U|t - N < f- . < t} - Each consumer
i is characterized by so that he lives from period 9. up to period
i i
+ N . *\]j the transactions are costless but we assume that transactions
i
can be made only among living generations for the periods they live. Hence
in each period t , there are m spot markets for each commodity, m futures
markets each for delivery date t = t+1, .-., t+N and a bond market each
for maturization date T = t+1, ..., t+N . Let x (t) be a vector of net
purchases that consumer i makes in period t to be delivered at
x = t, t+1, ... t+N . Each x'T (t) :E and we write
x
1
= (xX (t), x1 (t), ... x* (t)} which is the list of spot and future
i
. .
„m(N+l)
transactions l made at time t . x is zn E
A unit of bond is a contract to deliver one unit of money at the
ib , K , 1
maturization date. Let x (t) h E be a net purchase of bond in period t
for delivery at T, T > t and x* = [x"\, , (t), ..., x .. w (t)J is the bond
— t t+1 t+N
transactions at t . Let us use infinite sequences of vectors in E
'L
is defined as x1 = [O, 0, . .., x^(t) , ..., x ...(t), 0,
...J and x__ is
is defined as x*b = (O, 0, ..., x^Ct) , ..., x^^t), 0, ...). Let
m
1
?. E be the cash balance of consumer i at the end of period t and
t
m
1
= (0, 0, . .., in* . .., mZ ,„, 0, . ..). Let us write the commodity price
6 c1 .+M
i i
,
in period t as p - (O, 0, ..., 0, ? Jt) , .... Pt+N (t), 0, ...} where
p (t)~ E™ is a vector of prices at : in the future market for delivery
at t , t < t < t+N . Also be od t ,
b /-„ „ b , ^ b
,
t
= (0, ..., o, Pt+1
(t), ...P* 0, " p* , ]* * -..} where P^(t)?E^ is the
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m 1
price of bond in t which natures at t , T > t . Finally p - E, is thi
price of money in t
. e.+N ., e.+N
,
r i , Xv 1 , ib. i i-
A consumption plan for i, [c. , (x )
_
,
(x ) , m
_ l. t~y . _. t t— o . _
i i
is budget feasibl e if
x
i i . „ i ^ n
a) c = w + Ex >
t~
,
. mi mi i b ib ra .. ib , . . -
b) pm _, = p ra - p x - p x + p i x (t) --F t t+1 *t t _t_t ~t_t *t t =
7 < t
where m. , = m"*" .
3 -1
1
A consumption plan for consumer i is optimal if it is budget
feasible and it is a u maximizer (over the set of all budget feasible
consumption plan of i).
An equilibrium is a pair of prices and feasible consumtion plans
(i.e., budget feasible for each i) , namely
. 6,+N ., 8 +N
UP,,' P,.* PJ f _, » (c , (x ) fl , (x ) , m ) J sucn that
~c _r l t-1 ~ -, t t— <v , _ i_ t— o „ ~ l—r
i l
a) The consumption plan of each consumer i is optimal,
b) I x = for all i.
,
i
) Z x =0 for all t
,
. .. t
i
d) Z m = m for all t (m i amount of money)
.
t
i
Proposition : Jj}£_ equil ;ribed in the Appendix .is
equivalent to the equilibr xt.
Proof : : An equilibr , in the ': in this Appendix
requires either p = i- t or . - ail t. For if

/-J
D =0 and p'' , > for some t , it would contradict to the mono tonicityF
t t-1
i i — j m m
of u and the fact that " m = m ' , Also if p = and p >
i
the above conditions are violated. mdly, the set of feasible plans is
homogeneous of degree zero (for p'
, p and p for any t) . Therefore
we can normalize prices in each period. We can do it by taking .p = p v. E
t ~r
for all t . Next, we shall see that PT (t) = p.( T ) and P (t) = p" for
ail r , t < t -
p (t) < p (x) and p (t) < p are obvious, for otherwise consumer
X — T 1 —
i with 6. < t < t < 6.+N can sell the good (bond) at t and obtain the
b b
arbitrage profit. Also p (t) ' p (t+1) and p (t) > p (t+1) and
T — 1 t — T
b IP
p_(t-l) > p for all t otherwise by the equilibrium conditions, there
T —
exist- i with 9 < t < t+1 < 6 +N ar'd m > who can make arbitrage
i = - - i t
profit by buying the good (or bond). Proceeding by induction, p (t) = p (t)
and p_(t) = p" for all t and r .
Given the equilibrium in the Appendix define x = l x (t) for all
*- t <tj n
i
, the consumption plan c with c = (c )._,• Then this consumption allocation
m
with normalized prices and p are a competitive equilibrium in the economy
described in the text.
•*
: Given the equilibrium in the text (p, c) , let us find an equilibrium
« ~q in Tii m
of the economy in the Appendix. Define p (t) = p , p (t) = p , p = pXT t
for all t and t . Let c = c for all i and t .
t t
Assume p > , for the case p =0 can be treated analogously.
By the monotonicity of u
, p >> for all t . Hence for any arbitrary
index k for good, p, > for all t . Fix the index k . Let x (t) =kt ~
for i , t , t , and let x. (t) = i and t , and all x > t+1
if j ^ k and all T ; t+2 if j = k

7-4
Let x (1) = x for . . .et P.C . be the set of households
with p (Dxj^l) - p'm = -; < be those with
p^CDx^CL) - iyn1 - 5* > . E e* . a is well defined
[
' N i ~ P,
~ itt~ ~ rr — i -j
for p m = p Z m > Lon. :h i./ e x* (1) = 6' /p
and for each i € F
' . Let c /:,, . By construction,
1 2k 1 1 k
p x* - p^m
1
< ana =
. Define in* = (p^ 1 - p.O/Pm .
~
-L ~ L 1 - J. ill
-i iGiven m , x for all i and t < T - 1 , define
^ i- i "1
x (T) = x + x,L,(r -1)
. Define. P„, as the set of households with
L L i. I
1 * T*l -
,-<
T
(T) - pT
K.
TpT
(T)x,_, p"rav__. = t^ < and N„, as the sec of households with
pm (T)x_(T) - p„cC . = 5_ > . Proceeding exactly the sarae way as before,T T T T— 1 t —
we can find x.„ and m^ which satisfies both budget condition and market
"a. X
clearing conditio .
Ev induction, we car. construct x and m for all i and t .
-
-
This is an equilibrium in the Appendix.
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